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Litigation

...........

Ethics
Competency
of Counsel
and Judicial
Responsibility
by Monroe H. Freedman

Chief Justice Warren Burger has been
complaining for over a decade that
"from one-third to one-half of the
lawyers who appear in the serious
cases are not really qualified to render
fully adequate representation." We
may quibble about his statistics, but
we cannot deny the substance of the
Chief Justice's complaint. There is a
significant amount of ineffective assistance of counsel, and that situation
is intolerable, both professionally and
constitutionally. Under Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, "A lawyer should represent a
client competently," and under the
sixth amendment, criminal defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.
The Chief Justice is correct in suggesting that law schools must bear a
heavy responsibility for training in
trial and appellate advocacy, as well
as in client-oriented skills such as interviewing and counselling. It is clear,
however, that much of the current
debate in this area ignores how much
legal education has progressed over
the last fifteen or twenty years.
Not long ago, for example, the
president of a bar association wrote to
the deans of New York law schools
suggesting the adjustment of law
school curricula to include an elective
course in trial and appellate advocacy. Law schools have such courses
and have made enormous gains in
developing methodology to teach
litigating skills. At Hofstra Law
School, which is typical in this regard,
there are over a dozen clinical programs and courses in advocacy, including two neighborhood law offices
and a tax clinic. In those programs,
students, under faculty supervision,
interview clients, draft pleadings,
research and write briefs, and appear
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in court and before administrative
agencies. In addition, lawyering skills
and legal ethics are increasingly emphasized in traditional substantive
law courses.
One of Chief Justice Burger's proposed remedies is that the third year
of law school be devoted to clinical
training in lawyering skills. In some
instances, however, law schools actually have been prevented from adopting programs like this, not because of
a lack of imagination or because of inertia within the law schools, but because of limitations imposed from
outside. In New York, for example,
the rules of the Court of Appeals
severely restrict any law school's efforts to provide students with clinical
experience.
Thus, while some judges and bar
associations are encouraging rules requiring that certain courses be given,
others prevent these innovations.
This possibly also explains why law
school representatives generally have
opposed any imposition of course requirements by lawyers and judges,
however well-meaning, who are outside the highly specialized area of
legal education.
My point is not that there is ground
for complacency about needed improvements in legal education. However, it is obvious that the principal
opportunity for major reform in dealing with incompetent practitioners
lies elsewhere than in further debate
over law school curricula and methodology.

Certification No Cure
Nor is certification the proper cure
for Chief Justice Burger's complaint
-at least, certainly not until several
crucial questions have been satisfactorily answered. Who will do the certifying? Who will certify the certifiers? What will the standards be? How
will exploitation of young lawyers
(compelled to serve as apprentices to

older lawyers) be avoided? What
steps will be taken to eliminate inadequate advocates from the ranks of
"experienced" members of the bar,
particularly in view of the fact that
current complaints obviously are
directed against those already in
practice?
To illustrate the last point, one
third to one half of the members of the
New York State Trial Lawyers Association may be incompetent (if we accept the Chief Justice's figures), but
they certainly are not stupid. Promptly after Chief Justice Burger's call for
certification in his 1973 Sonnett Lecture, that association proposed a certification program. The proposal, of
course, included a grandfather
clause, which in effect would make
certification unnecessary for attorneys already in practice-the very
lawyers whose past performance has
given rise to the idea that certification
is needed.

An Odd Aspect
One of the oddest aspects of the
current certification suggestion is the
emphasis on litigating attorneys. Indeed, the Chief Justice and others
have urged that certification be
limited, at first, to trial practice. It
surely cannot be believed, however,
that the level of competence is higher
among the large majority of lawyers
who never go to court-those who do
such office work as draft wills, plan
estates, write contracts, counsel on
business ventures, or prepare tax
returns.
In fact, in one critically important
respect the litigating attorney is the
lawyer least in need of certification,
because only the litigating attorney
operates in what the Chief Justice has
called the "goldfish bowl" of the
courtroom, under close and constant
scrutiny by the public, other attorneys, and-most important-by
the judges themselves.
And this brings me to my principal
point. If one third to one half of the
litigating lawyers are inadequate, and
if it "happens regularly" that attorneys are unable to handle criminal
cases assigned to them, and if Chief
Justice Burger in two decades on the
bench has indeed seen hundreds, if
not thousands, of "miscarriages of
justice" caused by incompetent lawyers, then who is best able to do something about it? Who, in fact, has a

responsibility to do something about
it?
The answer is obvious: Chief Justice Burger and his colleagues on the
bench have both the opportunity to
observe litigating attorneys and the
obligation to take remedial measures
regarding incompetent representation, if and when it occurs. Both the
Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Constitution require that
counsel be competent and effective.
Indeed, under Canon 7, counsel also
must be "zealous." Under the ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge is
required specifically to initiate appropriate disciplinary action against
a lawyer for any unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become
aware. [Canon 3B(3); see also Canons
3A(4) and 3B(1). ] The Code of Professional Responsibility also requires
lawyers (including judges) to report
violations of Disciplinary Rules. DR
1-103(A); DR 1-102(A)(1).
Despite these clear obligations
(and similar requirements under the
previous canons), neither the Chief
Justice nor virtually any other judge
has accepted that fundamental responsibility. In fact, they have tended
to go in precisely the opposite direction. Courts place such a "heavy burden" upon a defendant maintaining a
claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel that numerous cases undoubtedly never are appealed, and in
virtually all that are appealed, the inadequate attorney is "vindicated."
In many courts the client's heavy
burden requires proof not simply of
ineffective or incompetent counsel,
but that counsel was "horribly inept." Nothing less than showing a
"farce and mockery" will do. If a
defendant's attorney was demonstrably "mentally incapacitated and
of unsound mind," that "may" be
grounds for reversal, but does not
assure it.
In one case, the defendant's attorney did not have an office, was a
chronic alcoholic, and had to be summoned to court by a bench warrant.
Since the panel on appeal was one of
the most liberal in the country, the
defendant had the satisfaction of a
dissenting vote in his favor when his
conviction was affirmed.
Some courts have replaced the
"farce and mockery" rule with a
"reasonable competency" standard.
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Generally, however, those same
courts require a showing of prejudice
-which must be done, of course, on a
record initially made by the attorney
charged with incompetence. In a case
in which defense counsel appeared to
be sound asleep during the direct
testimony of prosecution witnesses,
the conviction was nevertheless affirmed. The court specifically found a
lack of prejudice, because "the testimony during the periods of counsel's
somnolence was not central to [the accused's] case ... "

In a 1972 decision, with Chief Justice Burger in the majority, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity
to provide standards for minimum
competency in litigation. Dissenting
from the denial of certiorari, Justice
Byron R. White, joined by Justice
William H. Rehnquist, wrote that the
Supreme Court was thereby "shirk[ing] its central responsibility as the
court of last resort, particularly its
function in the administration of
criminal justice .. .

Kept in Dark
Further insight into the problem of
incompetent attorneys and judicial irresponsibility is provided by a "decertification" practice in the United
States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. A Criminal Justice Act Panel composed of federal
judges has notified some attorneys
that their handling of cases has been
so bad that they will not be assigned
others. Yet no defendants represented by any of those lawyers ever
have had their convictions vacated on
that ground (which should be done
automatically), nor have any such
defendants even been informed of the
judges' opinion of their counsel's incompetence.
Unhappily, therefore, one is forced
to the inference that too many judges
are concerned about incompetence
because of its effects on their calendars, and not because of lawyers'
ethics or clients' constitutional rights.
The Chief Justice has in fact explained his concern by pointing to incompetence as "one of the major reasons for congestion and delay in
courts." As long as that continues to
be the prevailingjudicial concern, it is
unlikely that judges will risk possible
retrials by identifying instances of in(Pleaseturn to page 58)
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(Continuedfrom page 46)
competence. It is much easier to make
uninformed demands upon the law
schools, and issue ill-advised calls for
certification.
What is needed is for judges to assume the obligations expressed in the
former Canons of Judicial Ethics: "to
criticize and correct unprofessional
conduct" and "to support the federal
Constitution and . . . fearlessly
observe and apply fundamental . . .
guarantees." The Chief Justice, who
claims to have seen innumerable mis..
carriages of justice resulting from incompetence of counsel, but who ap
pears to have taken no corrective
action in any of them, might look
closer to home for the best cure for his
complaint.

Fair
Grand Jury
(Continuedfrom page 36)
In the Carter Administration, the
Justice Department has taken a
softened stand. It has gone part way
toward supporting change-though
not far enough. While Attorney
General Bell and others vigorously
opposed many of the Criminal Justice
Section proposals, the committee met
with Department representatives
several times during the drafting to
try to smooth areas of difference. By
the ABA annual meeting in August
1977, Justice Department opposition
had been winnowed down to only five
of the original twenty-six proposals.
Despite intense lobbying before the
meeting by U.S. Attorneys and a personal appearance on the House of
Delegates floor by the Attorney
General, the delegates gave their support to the contested principle on
counsel in the grandjury room by twoto-one.

The Justice Department has now
recognized the need for reforms,
through its support for twenty-two of
the principles in the final ABA
package and through its announcement in the summer of 1977 that it
was substantially revising portions of
its manual for U.S. Attorneys on
handling a grand jury. Many states,
too, are now considering changes in
their grand jury procedures-including California, New York, Michigan,
Ohio, Massachusetts and New Jersey.
Colorado in 1977 passed comprehensive legislation bringing extensive
reform of that state's grand jury
system.
Courts have also begun to scrutinize grand jury procedures more
scrupulously-reversing a long-time
"hands off" policy. In 1976, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit condemned a grand jury's gathering of
evidence against a person already indicted, calling the practice "a possible revival of a version of the English
Star Chamber." United States v.
Doss, 545 F.2d 548, 549 (1976).
Opponents of reform call these
measures overkill. They decry them
as undercutting and destroying the
grand jury system. This is an exaggerated fear. The grand jury will not
be made ineffectual. It cannot survive by infringing on the rights of
citizens. It cannot shortcut due process protections that are laced
throughout every other part of the
system. If prosecutors are not willing
to see some checks placed on their
virtually total domination of the
grand jury, it will surely be abolished
-for it will be seen for what it too
often is, a mask for the prosecution's
manipulation of the formal charging
process.
The ABA House of Delegates action in 1977 marked a recognition by
the legal profession that abuses have
occurred and demand correction.
Congress is now considering legislation to carry out many of these
reforms. Even more radical changes
in the grand jury, which would
render it unworkable or result in its
demise, will result if prompt action is
not taken.
Grand jury reform should be a
concern of the entire bar. It has
become an issue that cuts across all
lines within the legal profession.
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With the increasing use of the grand
jury in white-collar corporate investigations and in criminal antitrust
and tax cases, pressure for reform is
no longer confined to a small
number of criminal defense lawyers.
The trial bar must insure that
changes are made-pragmatic and
workable changes, ones that preserve the grand jury but make it fair.

From
the Bench
(Continuedfrom page 6)
many of the most flagrant and commonly occurring grand jury abuses.
I fear, however, that imposing any
or all of these various procedures will
only lead to a legal circus; that we will
merely be creating new issues and
in all probability more cumbersome
procedures to accomplish a practically useless task. I believe, for example,
that permitting counsel to accompany
a witness into the grand jury room will
inevitably lead to vigorous objections
and other proper adversarial tactics
by counsel. I say inevitably because
that is counsel's role. But the grand
jury is not and cannot be structured to
operate in an adversarial capacity; it
is by nature an ex parte body. The
preliminary hearing, by contrast, is
ideally suited to adversary proceedings.
Similarly, the requirement that
prosecutors present to the grand jury
exculpatory evidence on the issue of
guilt, although admirable in theory,
is unworkable in practice. Determinations of what is "exculpatory"
and on what issue, are difficult at
best. Further, the method of presentment can all but negate the impact of
such evidence. Moreover, even assuming adoption of the ABA's proposals, the requirement can only lead
to complicated and time-consuming
arguments by the witness's counsel,
arguments that must be heard by the
district court before the grand jury
may proceed. Again, substitution of
the preliminary hearing would satisfactorily resolve these problems.
Despite the impracticality of many
of the reform measures, recent cases

